CENT Paper Number One (B)
BEYOND REBT: The case for moving on
Copyright (c) Dr Jim Byrne, August 2009
In Albert Ellis's first paper on Rational Therapy, in 1957, he outlined a dozen ‘irrational beliefs', which
also appeared in Chapter 3 of his first book on Rational Therapy[1]. (Rational Therapy was later renamed Rational Emotive Therapy [RET] and then Rational Emotive Behaviour
Therapy [REBT]). Those beliefs were clearly irrational, as indicated by the following two examples:
"Irrational Idea No.1: The idea that it is a dire necessity for an adult human being to be loved or approved
by virtually every significant other person in his community.
"Irrational Idea No.2:
The idea that one should be thoroughly competent, adequate, and achieving in all possible respects if one is to consider
oneself worthwhile."
These are clearly nutty ideas, because of what
is demanded or specified within them. However, Albert Ellis and his closest collaborators went on to draw a false
inference from the fact that these statements are clearly irrational and indefensible. He, and they, concluded,
that it was because of the demand - or ‘dire necessity', in the first belief - and
the ‘should' (as a more specific demand) - in the second: and not because of what
was demanded. However, this does not follow as logically as he, and they, concluded.
Why not?
Firstly, the beliefs in 1 and 2 above are irrational because they are such gross
exaggerations; and as such they are clearly illogical expectations. And:
Secondly,
we can keep the "dire necessity", and substitute it into another statement, and that new statement does not
become irrational. For example:
"It is a dire necessity that I not get lost while orienteering
on this cold mountain side in winter". Why is it a dire necessity? Because: if I do get lost, and cannot
get found again, then I will almost certainly die; quite quickly. That's what makes it dire, and necessary! And
there is nothing irrational about living my time on that mountain side from that belief. "It is a dire necessity
that I not get lost, or left behind, while orienteering on this cold mountain". It is not ‘just a strong
preference'! My desire to live is much more than a mere preference. Try killing me and you'll see just how strong
my commitment to living is. To this organism sitting here, typing these words, it is a dire necessity that I go
on living!
Of course, if I develop a terminal illness, and I cannot find a cure, no
matter how hard I try, and no matter who I consult, then I will drop my dire necessity to live. In the face of such
an intractable reality, i will surrender to reality. But not on a cold mountain, where a bit of extra vigilance, real
anxious concern to get the hell out of there, by sticking close to the team, could save my life. Then I will concede:
I must be dying, because I am!
It's all a question of the appropriacy of the demand.
How logical and realistic is it. If it is illogical or unrealistic or unreasonable, then it is by definition "irrational",
and I'd better drop it. But if it is realistic, reasonable, and logical, then it is "rational" and I may keep
it without overly upsetting myself.
Here's another example:
Having
taken a strong laxative this morning, and given that I am not a little baby, but a mature man, and that I am travelling a
long distance by bus: "It is a dire necessity that I not poop my pants while travelling on this bus". There
is nothing irrational about that belief. Indeed, it would be irrational to say: "I strongly prefer not
to poop my pants, but it's not essential that I avoid that". This is the stuff of transcendental
idealism, and not at all connected to the kinds of beliefs and values that real humans hold in real social communities around
the world.
But am I now saying that "musts" and "shoulds" are not
implicated in human disturbance? Quite categorically I am not saying that. In fact, I (accidentally)
found a way of validating the claim that humans are very often disturbed by the "musts"
and "shoulds" that they bring to their frustrations, losses, failures, threats, dangers, and so on.
However, because Dr Ellis and his closest collaborators falsely assumed - in practice - that it was the demand
per se in the two beliefs above that made them irrational, they went on to falsely assume that getting rid of
the words ‘should', ‘must' and ‘have to' etc., from our vocabularies is the road to rationality and undisturbed
lives, when we encounter difficulties and frustrations[2].
In fact it is the demand, combined with what is demanded,
that causes the disturbance; and it is furthermore the precise meaning
that the client brings to the demand, and what is demanded, that causes their disturbance.
To clarify: If a client uses a ‘demanding word' and means it one way, it will almost certainly precipitate
exaggerated emotional disturbance; while the same person using the same ‘demanding word' and meaning it differently,
will produce a much milder emotional response.
Perhaps the best way to test client's demands is
to see them as 'conclusions' to 'arguments', in the sense that those two words are used in Critical Thinking: (e.g. Bowell
and Kemp, 2005) [6]. So if the client says "She (my mother) should not have treated me that way", we
take that to be a conclusion, and ask: "What are the premises upon which this conclusion is founded?" We then,
using the principle of generosity, reconstruct the best possible form of argument that the client's premises will support,
and then check to see if the premises are true, and if this is a logically valid argument. If it is logically valid
then the client can support and defend it. But if the conclusion does not follow logically from the premises, or one or more
of the premises is not true, then the argument falls. The client can keep the word "should", but they have
to drop the conclusion which included that word, because it could not be supported by logical argumentation.
Thus it seems to me that cognitive and rational therapists must have a good understanding of Critical Thinking as a philosophical
skill set.
By contrast, REBT went on to develop a process of ‘Disputing Irrational Beliefs'
as the core of its work, and this is sometimes most helpful for clients. However, once it is generalized to ‘disputing
all musts and shoulds', including the client's 'moral shoulds', REBT becomes an amoral, and even
an anti-moral influence in the world - despite the fact that that was not Dr Ellis's intention; and is not a conscious goal
on the part of his followers.
One of Dr Ellis's strongest supporters - Dr Tom Miller - took Al's
basic belief system and enhanced it into a form of Logical Positivism - in which moral statements become ‘meaningless';
and in which ‘shoulds describe reality'. In other words, for Tom Miller, if ‘shoulds and musts' do not conform
to reality as it exists in this moment, they become meaningless.
Why am I defending the use
of the words ‘should' and ‘must' - even though I acknowledge that they are often implicated in human disturbances?
Because they are also implicated in our moral prescriptions; and we need to hold on to our moral prescriptions. We cannot
have a moral discourse without ‘should' and ‘must'. But we can have effective psychotherapies that leave
most shoulds and musts in place, while teaching the client how to think critically about their arguments and their conclusions;
and to reframe their disturbing perceptions/interpretations. They can keep their shoulds,
if they use them for the right kinds of purposes. And they can get rid of their disturbances by learning to look at
their lives from a number of equally viable perspectives, each of which is better than the one they habitually use.
The more realistic a person's expectations are, the less disturbable they become, regardless of how many so called ‘demanding
words' they happen to use to describe what they want and what they prescribe morally.
When Dr
Ellis was born, in Pittsburgh, in 1913, the Religion of Science was dominant in the world in general. In 1921, when
Dr Ellis was eight years old, Erwin Schrödinger spoke at Trinity College Dublin, and explained to the transfixed audience
how science was totally objective, and scientists were able to ensure this objectivity by their ability to "step back"
from their experiments so they did not affect the results in any way. It would be another 35 years before Thomas Kuhn
shattered this delusion by demonstrating that science passes through a succession of revolutions in its beliefs; and that
it is in any case organized into rival camps, each with its own journals, conferences and antagonistic beliefs. Some
years later, Karl Popper argued that science is based on conjecture, and the only valid use of experiments is to try to invalidate
a conjecture. (You cannot use experiments to ‘prove' something!) The God of Positivist Science was on the
rack. However, it hobbled on for quite some time to come, and indeed it is still alive and well among many prominent
Clinical Psychologists in the USA today; and it seems to be the foundation of the ‘medical model'. But it seems
much more reasonable - if you read the history of the philosophy of science[3]- to conclude that "all there is is story (about something which cannot be directly apprehended independent
of human interpretation)". Science is a patchwork quilt of plausible stories, just like religion, philosophy, and
psychotherapy. Just like every other ideology. And REBT was one of those plausible stories for more than fifty
years. But a revolutionary shift is currently taking place. The very best elements, and the most durable elements,
of REBT will survive this revolution. But some of its core ideas are dead on their feet.
Also, when Dr Ellis
was growing up in New York City, in the 1920s and '30s, it seems likely that most families were headed by patriarchal, authoritarian,
mainly religious parents, who went too far in repressing their children's 'bad wolves'. It would have seemed inappropriate
for Dr Ellis to take responsibility, in that repressive environment, for maintenance of public morality. However, today,
almost a century after Al was born, we live in communities that are under siege by out of control children and adults, in
a world of greed, growing inequality, and widespread decline in moral standards. In this new context, counsellors and
therapists have to consider the effects of their words on public discourse about moral standards.
For a good number of years, I failed to notice that REBT was strongly advocating that people ignore social norms
regarding moral judgement. For example, Dr Ellis's repeated references to the claim that "Hitler was not a
bad man!" And "Why must life be fair?" These seemed to be 'harmless therapeutic tools', but the
time would come when they would be applied socially as guides to action or non-action. I was finally awoken to this
danger by the way in which Dr Ellis was treated in the final years of his life by some of his former colleagues.
In the final years of Albert Ellis's life, certain things were said about him, and certain things were done towards
him, which we, the ‘Friends of Ellis' and the ‘Justice for Albert Ellis Campaign', wished to oppose. When
Dr Ellis announced the setting up of an international campaign to have him (Dr Ellis) reinstated to his job and his seat on
the board of his institute, we wanted to develop arguments and analysis to support that goal. However, we ran into two
problems.
(1) The board had split 4:3 in July and September 2005, and both groups were
promoting different stories about what had happened. Ellis's supporters naturally supported his story. Therefore,
we wanted to categorize as immoral those actions that had been taken against Dr Ellis. It was initially very difficult
for us to find the language to make the simple statement: "this is immoral". We did not have the vocabulary
to even make such a simple statement, for many months after we became unhappy with the way he was being treated. And
we never succeeded in getting to the point of opening up a ‘moral discourse', using the language of morality: which
is based on should, ought and must. This eventually showed up as a deficit in REBT philosophy.
(2) As the campaign/conflict progressed, less and less light was being generated, and more and more heat, on both
sides of the argument. I called for a public enquiry to look into the facts of the case, but this idea fell on deaf
ears on both sides of the argument. Because of this lack of detailed enquiry, based on researched. detailed facts, there
was quite an bad tempered and emotive wrangle that drifted on and on, getting nowhere. Although some highly admirable
documents were produced on Ellis's side (e.g. the Minority Reports by two board members; and some logical analyses by Gayle
Rosellini) there were strict limits to what could be achieved in the absence of a public enquiry. The overall
effect was to point towards the deficiencies of REBT in managing emotional conflict: (in that the board members, taken collectively,
had clocked up more than 250 years of REBT theory and practice., and yet they could not agree on anything).
Why were the supporters of Ellis unable to develop a moral discourse? Because our training in REBT had persuaded
us that there are no valid shoulds or musts about human preferences. We had been trained to believe that ‘should'
and ‘must' are actually descriptions of reality. (Eg. ‘Steam should appear
when the water reaches boiling point!' I now realize this is a misuse of the word 'should'; as we really mean 'Steam
will appear - with a probability of virtually 100% - when the water reaches boiling point!')
In other words, we had been trained, and trained ourselves, to believe that all there are - realistically - are ‘logical
musts'; and that all moral statements are actually statements of preferences. These ideas are at the
core of REBT philosophy.
I no longer subscribe to those extreme REBT beliefs about ‘should'
and ‘must'. I now think it is important to state that there are both logical shoulds and moral shoulds,
(and also other types of shoulds, such as conditional shoulds), and that they sometimes stand in diametrical opposition
to each other. For example, suppose you are passing an alley in a big city, and you see a young man mugging an old lady,
and forcibly taking her handbag from her. What would be your response, if you only had a choice between the following
two options?
"If he is mugging her, then he must be mugging her!"
(Logical statement of fact). Or:
"He should not be mugging her, and
he must be stopped if at all possible". (Statement of moral objection, and empathy with the victim).
All too often, REBT teaches its students to focus on option 1, because we are in the business of helping our clients
to overcome feelings of guilt and shame about things they have done, where they have castigated themselves for having done
something they "should" not have done. Our empathy for the client drives us in the direction of encouraging
them to forgive themselves, not by looking for extenuating circumstances, or admitting human frailty, and committing to behaving
like a good person in the future[1] . No, our emphasis is on invalidating ‘the should'. Because if we can invalidate ‘the
should', then there is no ‘weapon' for the client to use to castigate and humiliate themselves with. This now
seems to me to be a wholly inadequate response to a complex problem.
When clients come to us with
problems of shame and guilt, because they have transgressed their own moral code, it might seem that we are being charitable
and empathic by challenging their moral shoulds, and insisting that logically, if they did something, then they must
have done it; should have done it; have to have done it; and so on. A more sensible way to go, with the
benefit of hindsight, is to treat the past as past, and to ask the client: "Are you committed to being a good person
in the future?" If the answer is ‘Yes', then they can forgive themselves their past transgression against
their own moral should, and move into a future in conformity with that should, without any feeling of guilt or shame.
We do not need to dismantle human morality in order to promote mental harmony. This is a clear case of throwing the
baby out with the bathwater.
Of course, some ‘shoulds' that clients bring to therapy
may be unrealistic or unreasonable, and those shoulds can be reasonably challenged. But we must be aware of
the need to preserve social morality lest we become the victims of the immorality that we may inadvertently promote!
That is a selfish motivator, but there is a wider one. If we broadcast the end of moral shoulds, we invite
the ending of civilized society and empathic behaviour.
Moral ‘shoulds' are not just ‘preferences'
masquerading as shoulds. They are prescriptions. With moral ‘shoulds' we prescribe social rules
and required behaviours, and we implement sanctions to ensure that those moral ‘shoulds' are obeyed. Where
those moral shoulds break down, we see nothing but social misery and the fragmenting of society. Therefore, we must
be very careful not to contribute to the breakdown of moral order.
Albert Ellis's original motivation
for ‘getting rid of the shoulds' was a noble one. But it was also short-sighted. Who could have known that
he would end his life invoking moral shoulds in the New York Supreme Court, while denying that there
are any valid ‘shoulds' about fairness in newspaper interviews with journalists. He ended his life in a paradox:
"There are no shoulds; but those people should not have removed me from office!"
The bell cracked!
~~~
The Institute for CENT Studies arose out of
the philosophical crisis in REBT, and is the first post-REBT/CBT institution to set about the challenge of resolving the tension
between logical imperatives and moral imperatives. This we intend to do through the development of Cognitive Emotive
Narrative Therapy (CENT), which will be further developed to incorporate moral philosophy and critical thinking at its foundation.
The therapeutic functions of CENT will be natural outgrowths of that fusion of morality and logic. (A preliminary description
of CENT can be found here).
The second integration that will be attempted by this Institute is the integration
of the individual self and the social network, through the modelling of mother-child interactions, and the investigation of
narratives and discourses of community development and personal connection and responsibility.
The
third integration that we will attempt is the integration of the Freudian, the Bernian and the Ellisian models of the human
psyche, into a new model of mind, in which:
the body: (diet and exercise[2]);
the brain: (brain food and brain/mind development);
the
environment: (relationships, right livelihood, living conditions);
personal narratives: (stories,
scripts, beliefs, attitudes, values);
and a sense of "something bigger than the self":
(a spiritual practice, or a community involvement);
are all treated as equal contributors to personal
happiness and mental tranquillity.
The Institute for CENT Studies exists to complete these integrations.
Dr Jim Byrne
Executive Director
The Institute for Cognitive Emotive Narrative Therapy Studies
26th August 2009
~~~
To reference this paper in a publication, please use the following citation:
Byrne, J.
(2009a) Beyone REBT: The case for moving on. CENT Paper No.1(b). Hebden Bridge: The Institute for CENT Studies.
Ellis, A. (1962) Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy. New York: Carol
Publishing Group. Pages 60-88.
[1]In the abstract theory of REBT it was recognized that it was the "demand" (which is a B [belief])
interacting with the event (which is an A [Activating event]) which causes the C (or Consequent emotions).
However, in practice, Al and most of the rest of us proceeded as if the "demand" was the most important
contributor. This may have occurred because it was often argued - quite falsely - that the A (Activating event, or stimulus)
normally cannot be changed; and therefore you have to change the B, if you want to avoid an overly upset
emotion. However, in the two irrational beliefs listed at the top of this post, the 'A's - which are failures to be
loved by everybody, or to be universally competent - will disappear when subjected to a challenge to the logicality of the
preceding inference or 'frames'. Those inferences or frames most likely include: 'Some people are loved by everybody
in their community; and therefore I must achive that'. 'Being loved by everybody in my community is achievable, and
because it would benefit me, therefore I must achieve it'. And possibly some others. But all of these are false
inferences. When these inferences are undermined, the irrational belief will not arise, because it does not have any
premises upon which to arise. Thus it is not necessary for me to challenge the client's 'demands', which fail to arise when
their premises are challenged.
Losee, J. (1993) A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Third
edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
REBT denies that there is such a thing as "a good person" or a "bad person".
What is the argument? Firstly, REBT distinguishes between a person and their behaviour, and says: "A person is
not their behaviour". This is a valuable distinction when it comes to areas of competence, such as believing: "I
am now a bad person just because I wrote a bad essay, and got an F on the test". But this does not work when
it concerns issues of morality. "I am not a bad person, just because I killed a few people!" Yes you
are! Grow up! What is the REBT view in the realm of morality? That "a good person would always and
only do good things", and a "bad person would always and only do bad things". But this is not a socially
agreed definition of "good" or "bad" person. Why not? Let's test it. Imagine
a bank where the manager sees clients all day long regarding loans, overdrafts, and problems with their accounts. And
in this particular bank, the manager has a ‘quirk'. He likes to murder every tenth client who presents for a meeting
with him. The other nine he treats with the utmost courtesy, and even leniency in the financial aspects of their transactions.
But with every tenth one, he just takes out an ice pick, says "This is not personal", and cracks open their skull
with a single, swift blow. Can you imagine the bank staff, customers and the local community concluding: "Well
he's not a bad man, because a bad man would kill all ten of them, and not every tenth one - i.e. he would ‘always and
only do bad things' - but since he only kills one tenth of them he cannot be said to be a ‘bad person'? Therefore,
we will continue to bank here, and just make the necessary calculations to ensure we are never the tenth person in".
No! After the first killing, the police would be called, and the "bad man" would be taken away, imprisoned,
tried for murder, and "sent down" for being a bad man. All the papers would agree, as would all the readers
of the papers. Only Albert Ellis's ghost would demur. Sorry Al, you got it wrong on this one. He becomes
a "bad man" for his bad act. Later, when he has made adequate reparations, society might be willing to reallocate
him to the category of "good man", but not before that point.
[2]Plus meditation and relaxation.
Bowell, T. and Kemp, G. (2005) Critical Thinking: a concise guide. Second
edition. London: Routledge.
~~~